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Focusing on gas, this article explores the role of the European Commission in the process of European
Union energy security policy development, and the extent to which the policy area is becoming
increasingly supranational. Situating the article within the literature on agenda-setting and framing, it
is argued that a policy window was opened as a result of: enlargement to include more energy import
dependent states, a trend of increasing energy imports and prices, and gas supply disruptions. From the
mid-2000s, the Commission contributed to a shift in political norms, successfully framing import
dependency as a problem requiring an EU-level solution, based on the institution’s pre-existing
preferences for a diversiﬁed energy supply and internal energy market. Whilst Member States retain
signiﬁcant sovereignty, the Commission has achieved since 2006 creeping competencies in the internal,
and to a lesser extent external, dimensions of EU energy policy.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
The development of recent EU energy policy has been made
within the context of: (1) a trend of increasing energy import
dependence (from 50 per cent of total EU energy consumption in
2007 to a forecast of 65 per cent in 2030) (European Commission,
2007); (2) increasing prices (quintupling of oil prices between
2002 and 2010); (3) EU enlargement and (a) historical relations
with Russia/USSR and, (b) relatively higher energy import depen-
dence; (4) gas supply disruptions. As a result, energy security as
deﬁned by the EU has been undermined, and a policy window
opened which the European Commission1 attempted to exploit.
The scope of the article relates to evaluating European inte-
gration in the areas of external diversiﬁcation of gas supplies, andk, tmaltby@gmail.com
cense.the internal EU gas market,2 focusing on the ﬁrst part of the EU’s
deﬁnition of energy security—‘Reliable energy supplies at reason-
able prices’ (European Commission, 2012). The analysis is a
theoretically informed exploration of the role of a supranational
policy entrepreneur, the Commission, and a contribution to the
debate regarding European Union integration and the relationship
in terms of authority and policy responsibilities between the
member state and supranational level, applied to an area of ‘high’
politics (Hoffmann, 1966).3 The research question addressed is
how the constellation of power in energy security policy has
developed between the Member States and the Commission.
Offering an explanation of the evolution of power and compe-
tence in EU energy policy, this research uses a methodology of2 The two are linked, in that an internal energy market requires an external EU
energy policy, and that internal interconnection of infrastructure mitigates against
disruptions to supply.
3 ‘In areas of key importance to the national interest, nations prefer the
certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the
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agenda-setting and policy entrepreneurship to develop a concep-
tual framework, and evaluating empirical data derived from
secondary academic literature, primary EU documents, and 16
semi-structured elite interviews conducted between 2010 and
2012 with actors in the Commission, Permanent Representations
to the EU and energy NGOs. The analysis is conducted by tracing
Commission proposals since the 1950s, comparing these to EU
Regulations, Directives and treaty evolution. This will demon-
strate a degree of path dependency and continuity of Commission
energy proposals. The institution has long advocated addressing a
lack of diversiﬁcation of supplies, but only within the last decade
has successful policy entrepreneurship been demonstrated. This
research offers an explanation as to why the arguments framing
energy (in)security as an EU problem requiring increased supra-
national governance as the solution became more attractive to
Member States.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Next, a
theoretical framework for understanding EU agenda-setting, policy-
making and policy entrepreneurship is presented, highlighting the
role of ‘selling’ policy solutions to emergent policy problems.
Utilising this framework, section three examines the relative ineffec-
tiveness of the Commission’s promotion of a communitarianised EU
energy policy until 2006. Section four explains the Commission’s
recent, and increasing, role in energy policy development. Finally,
section ﬁve concludes that the Commission’s policy entrepreneur-
ship success increased due to, and within the context of, EU
enlargement, increasing import dependency and prices, and gas
supply disruptions. As a result, a policy windowwas opened that the
institution was able to exploit with some success.2. Theorising European Commission policy entrepreneurship
This section examines Kingdon’s (1995) work on federal
government and develops it by taking into account insights from
the literature on agenda-setting in the EU and supranational
policy entrepreneurship, and applies it to EU energy policy.
Kingdon (1995) theorised that successful policy entrepreneurship
required the ‘coupling’ of policy, political and problem ‘streams’.
The problem stream consists of those conditions which policy-
makers interpret as problems. The policy stream consists of the
various ‘solutions’ developed by the Commission, since the 1960s,
of a communitarianisation of energy policy. The politics stream
consists of political developments, in this case a trend of increas-
ing energy imports and prices, along with enlargement of the EU
to include NMS which felt their national security was undermined
by dependence on gas imports (particularly from Russia).
Kingdon (1995) posited that an issue would develop on the
policy agenda when there was a coupling of the three streams,
which could occur during the opening of policy window of
opportunity such as that provided by a (perceived) crisis or a
prominent event highlighting (the emergence of) a political
problem. The theoretical frame developed here is then based on
Kingdon’s (1995) conceptualisation of policy entrepreneurship
developed and applied to the Commission to include historical
institutionalist concepts of path dependency and critical junc-
tures in policy evolution (Pierson, 1996; Bulmer, 2009) and the
constructivist insights of norm construction and Commission
entrepreneurship (Kaunert, 2007, 2010a,b). The research also
takes into account insights regarding how this policy entrepre-
neurship can be effective, and how it can be operationalised.(footnote continued)
uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender [integration]’ (Hoffmann,
1966, 882).The concept of policy entrepreneurship has been applied to the
Commission by several authors (Pollack, 1997; Laffan, 1997;
Moravcsik, 1999; Peterson, 2008; Kaunert, 2007, 2010a, 2010b;
Du¨r et al., 2010; Wettestad et al., 2012). Due to an emphasis on
output legitimacy in the EU, notably the quality of policies in
terms of ‘rationality’ and ‘effectiveness’ (Kaunert, 2010a,b;
Scharpf, 1999), the Commission actively tries to develop European
networks of experts and stakeholders; convening expert groups
and attempting to increase expertise and support from stake-
holders (Princen, 2011). As Wallace notes, and the discussion of
post-Lisbon energy policy development later demonstrates,
usually new formal policy competences follow informal Commu-
nity discussion into policy areas not ﬁrmly deﬁned by treaties
(Wallace, 2002: 328), bolstered by high quality, rational and
effective arguments. Exploiting informational and expertise
advantages the Commission DGs can attempt ‘shap[e] the con-
tours of policy debates along their favoured frames’ (Littoz-
Monnet, 2012: 520).
Whilst each Commission DG has its own overlapping, but
distinct, purview within the Council’s often general aims and
direction (Princen, 2011: 932), but in this case there are synergies
between DGs Trade, External Relations, Energy and Climate on
interlinking issues related to energy (environmental protection,
competition, and security) (See Personal Interview 1). Princen and
Rhinard (2006): 1126; noted that ‘strategically minded policy units
[andMember States] frame initiatives to ﬁt with certain institutional
venues’. Different (even competing) institutional venues may have
different priorities and perceive EU concern differently, yet solutions
need not be mutually exclusive. For example, DG Trade and DG
Energy frame the problem of reliance on Russian gas as risks in
different ways: (a) inhibiting competition and reasonable prices, and
(b) posing risks to gas supplies. Interviewees from both perceived
a situation of negative dependency for the EU (See Personal Inter-
view 2), with an interviewee from DG Energy explaining that with
regard to energy policy, ‘the overlapping objectives are mutually
reinforcing in terms of maintaining both priorities high on the
agenda of EU and constituent members’ (See Personal Interview 3).
The Commission is then able to propagate its policy recommen-
dations and contribute towards the shift in norms and perceptions
of energy security through interaction with Council Working Groups
and through acting as a useful partner to Member States. The
Commission can then offer a channel of inﬂuence for Member
States; providing expertise, advocacy and leadership before and
during negotiations. It has been argued that there is predisposition
of smaller EU Member States towards the EU; a mutually beneﬁcial
and reciprocal relationship which increases the Commission’s power
base and aids its policy initiatives, relative to a more often
confrontational relationship with the larger states, in return for
offsetting more limited administrative capacity which could other-
wise impede information-gathering ability, and comprehension of
new and complex EU policies and policy-making rules and norms
(Thorhallsson, 2006: 126; Bunse et al., 2005: 6; Katzenstein, 2003;
Panke, 2010: 803).4
The enlargement of the EU from 15 to 27 Member States
between 2004 and 2007 is likely to have aided the Commission’s
energy policy entrepreneurship, particularly given newer member
states’ (NMS) greater dependence on Russian gas imports and
historically derived suspicion of Russian foreign and energy
policy. The Commission’s interaction will all Member States
contributes towards a ‘self-sustaining dynamic’, entrenching an
issue as a priority on the EU’s agenda, and increasing EU activity4 Schmidt-Felzmann (2008, p. 174) highlights how the majority of bilateral
disputes involving Russia and the small(er) Member States are resolved with the
Commission assistance, and as section four demonstrates, this has continued
since 2008.
5 With the exception of a legally binding requirement to reach an EU average
of 20 per cent renewable energy sources in the energy mix by 2020.
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at Council level, may shift away to new or other concerns for
example as the memory of gas supply disruption(s) fades)
(Princen and Rhinard, 2006: 1122).
The Commission can frame problems and discourse to ‘inﬂu-
ence the interpretation of the problem, thereby pre-determining
possible answers’, which Bauer (2002: 386) describes as ‘discourse
framing’. For frames to achieve a position on political agendas, and
establish policies as priorities they need to refer to ‘wider societal
concerns’ (Rhinard, 2010), and make a convincing case regarding
the importance of scale to energy security, that a ‘supranational
scale’ is appropriate in response to the context of the problem, and
that this is then ‘purposefully constructed’ and promoted by actors
in the Commission (Leitner, 1997: 124). This can be done in such a
way that it requires policy and legislation development, that can
lead to ‘creeping competences’, ‘a steady, if surreptitious, growth of
the powers of the Commission’ (Majone, 2002: 380; also Mayer,
2008), exploiting the notion of community interest (Lequesne,
2000: 39–40), through the Commission’s role managing policy at
the focal point of the EU’s ‘networked administrative system’
(Egeberg, 2006: 15).
The identiﬁcation of the supranational scale of energy govern-
ance as a necessary solution to the policy problem is one which is
socially constructed. Niemann and Schmitter (2009: 57) argue
that through a process of functional spill-over, elites act as agents
which sell the necessity, urgency and compulsion to act through
highlighting issue salience. For the Commission, building cred-
ibility, capacity and competence in energy policy has required the
construction of a narrative about why the issue is European in
scope (Leitner, 1997; Princen, 2011: 930–931); that the problem
is a common European one, and by extension so is the solution.
The agency of the Commission is in inﬂuencing Member State
actors’ interpretation and response to events, contributing
towards the internalisation of socially constructed norms, which
act as ‘guiding devicesyfor the recognition and appreciation of
extraordinary crises and indicators, as well as for the search for
policy alternatives’ (Kaunert, 2010b: 38). In this case, the indica-
tors and ‘crises’ of rising fossil fuel prices, rising imports, enlarge-
ment and supply disruptions.
The importance of policy-tracing to the analysis is highlighted
by the historical institutionalist insights of Bulmer (1998; 2009),
and Pierson (1996), demonstrating how path dependent incre-
mental development (path dependency) can inﬂuence the course
of a policy; that values and norms can develop, accumulate,
evolve and became embedded within an institution. Within the
Commission this resulted in a pro-integration mission and insti-
tutional culture, with market integration as a predominant norm,
a ‘bounded rationality based on the endogenous construction of
experience: ‘learning by doing’ (Bulmer, 1998: 373). The constant
reiteration by the Commission in policy recommendations since
the 1960s was of member state sovereignty in energy policy and
union import dependency as a problem and supply diversiﬁcation
and supranational governance as a solution.
The Commission had a role in structuring the iterative process
of policy-making, and policy recommendations (including Green
and White Papers) were informed by their predecessors, with the
broad outline of their objectives similar in 1960 to those in 2012.
Capitalising on a ﬁrst mover advantage (Kaunert, 2010a: 176–
177), the Commission was able to exploit the policy window as it
had solutions to the emergent problem at hand to propagate and
disseminate, and was able to contribute towards the construction
and revision of a policy frame (Stone Sweet et al., 2001: 11); a
convergent intersubjective understanding of energy security as a
problem with a supranational solution.
The Commission, as a supranational policy entrepreneur, can
effect policy change through: (1) legitimacy through building onpre-existing norms of policy-making; (2) expertise and knowl-
edge based authority; (3) continuous advocacy; (4) alliances and
interaction with member states, (5) selling the solution during the
policy window opened by the crisis, and (6) contributing towards
the social construction of a narrative regarding a problem, and an
intersubjective understanding of a (supranational) solution.
This article will demonstrate in Section four that since January
2006, the Commission has been particularly active in ‘coupling’ the
problem stream of contemporary energy security issues, to the
‘policy stream’ of its long-held solutions (examined in Section 3),
contributing to a degree of consensus amongst Member States that
whilst signiﬁcant sovereignty of energy mix and source remains
their sovereign right (Article 194(2)),5 it is the EU which is an
appropriate level to take certain measures contributing to increasing
energy security in terms of security of gas supplies.3. Early Commission energy policy entrepreneurship, from
the 1960s until 2006
This section explains how the policy stream, or ‘solutions’,
developed by the Commission to counter the problem of energy
insecurity and import dependence between the 1960s and 2006
led to limited outcomes, and EU energy policy remained one
characterised by member state sovereignty. Only in 1973, and the
oil ‘crisis’ was there a policy window of opportunity, but the
Commission was unable to exploit this, leading to divergent
Member State solutions.
The context to recent Commission activism is that energy
security has been an ever present concern for the Union, and The
European Coal and Steel Community (The ECSC, 1951) and
European Atomic Energy Community Treaty (Euratom Treaty,
1957) provide examples of early supranational governance in
the policy area. The ECSC (1951: Art.3) set out the concept of
‘Security of Supply’ in Community law, and as a main objective.
The focus of this was internal, given heavy dependence on coal, a
common source within the founding members of the European
Community (EC). The Euratom Treaty (1957) established an
internal market along with a Supply Agency (operational from
1960) that led to community policy in the ﬁeld of nuclear energy;
the potential for central intervention to ‘ensure that all users in
the Community receive a regular and equitable supply’ (Euratom
Treaty, 1957: Art. 52), and a 20 per cent maximum supply of
uranium from a single non-EU state. The Supply Agency’s com-
petency extended to ‘an exclusive right to conclude contracts’
relating to supplies (Euratom Treaty, 1957: Art. 53) (though
member states retained the right to appeal to the Commission).
As such the ECSC and Euratom Treaties provided ‘energy policy
tools based on exclusive supranational powers vested in a central
authority’ (Andoura et al., 2010: II; also Kirchner and Berk,
2010: 869).
The Commission’s 1968 ‘Community Energy Policy’ (European
Commission, 1968), set out dependency concerns, and a Commu-
nity energy policy was a stated aim of the Council as early as 1964
(Council of the European Union, 1964). In 1968, lack of integration
in the energy sphere was considered to be a ‘dangerous trend’
which could be changed only through a ‘Community energy policy
which fully integrates the energy sector into the common market’,
counterbalancing ‘risks arising from the great dependence of the
Member States on imports and from insufﬁcient diversiﬁcation of
the sources of supply’ (European Commission, 1968: 5).
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that the EU should have a general framework for action and
measures in place in case of supply disruption, and that a
common energy market should be implemented. Despite aware-
ness of the potential hazards of energy dependency, the period up
to 1970 was characterised by a combination ‘relatively low prices’
and ‘ample availability’, until a restriction of oil supplies led to the
prediction that the era of easy supply ‘has little chance of being
maintained’ (European Commission, 1972: 2–3). The 1973 ‘energy
crisis’ highlighted both concerns about vulnerability to interrup-
tions of energy supply, and the inadequacy of securing supplies
for the EU whilst policy-making remained within an intergovern-
mental domain, though Member States instead opted for indivi-
dual solutions; from indigenous nuclear, (North Sea) oil and gas,
and diversiﬁed supplies (Kirchner and Berk, 2010; 869).
Commission recommendations were largely ignored by the
Council and Member States until the 1990s. In 1981, the Commis-
sion predicted a substantial increase in energy demand, but
recognising the heterogeneity of preferences amongst Member
States did not propose any ‘substantial centralization of energy
policy instruments’ nor ‘uniformity in the diversiﬁcation of
supply’ (European Commission, 1981: 10). The potential for
Community action was exempliﬁed by, but also limited to, the
Union’s nuclear energy policy. The 1986 Single European Act
introduced measures to establish an internal market by the end of
1992 (Council of the European Union, 1986: Art 8a), providing the
groundwork for legislation on the internal energy market imple-
mented from the 1990s. An energy plan of action to 1995 focused
on putting the ‘concept of Community solidarity into practice’
with the objective of ‘geographical diversiﬁcation of the Commu-
nity’s external sources of supply’ and ‘greater integration, free
from barriers to trade, of the internal energy market’ (Council of
the European Union, 1986). Energy external objectives lacked
substantive legislation to achieve them, though the ﬁrst internal
energy market Directives were launched in 1996 and 1998
(Council of the European Union, 1996, 1998).
No Community action was set out in the in the external
dimension in either the Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997) or
Nice (2001) Treaties. The Council had competency, acting unan-
imously on Commission proposals (consulting with the European
Parliament (EP)) (Art. 130s). Commission competency was limited to
the internal energy market, though the Maastricht Treaty’s Article
3 set out the objective of extending the activities of the Community
to the sphere of energy infrastructure. Throughout the 1990s, the
Commission attempted to increase energy security by exporting EU
legislation, to develop the principle of interdependence and rules-
based market multilateralism through such policies as the Energy
Charter Treaty (ECT), which focused on market access issues for
transit and supply and market governance. This principle was
successfully exported to ﬁfty one countries in Asia and Europe.
Crucially, Russia signed but did not ratify the ECT and withdrew its
provisional application in August 2009 (Energy Charter, 2010). In a
2000 Green Paper, the Commission continued to emphasise the
need to diversify supplies, offering a warning that ‘the Union suffers
from having no competence and no community cohesion in energy
matters’ (European Commission, 2000: 28), highlighting that exter-
nal energy dependence was increasing from 50 per cent in 1999 to a
projected 70 per cent in 2030. Yet there was also the prediction of
short term (5–10 years) security of gas supply, and dependency on
Russia was considered both positive, and ‘relatively comfortable’6
(European Commission, 2000: 81).6 ‘[T]he continuity of [gas] supplies from the former Soviet Union, and then
Russia, over the last 25 years is testimony to an exemplary stability’ (European
Commission 2000: 40).At an informal European summit in October 2000, the Com-
mission received the mandate for a regular energy dialogue
energy with Russia, from January 2001, but whilst the EU’s 2003
European Security Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2003)
referred to energy dependence as a ‘special concern’ as the largest
world importer of gas and oil, it was not considered to be one of
the ﬁve ‘Key Threats’ facing the EU.7
The Commission had developed its preferred solutions to
address EU energy insecurity within the policy stream (Kingdon,
1995). As Section four demonstrates, not until the EU enlarge-
ments in 2004 and 2007 was there a convergence with the
political stream, a receptive environment of newer, and to a
lesser extent older, member states concerned with increasing
energy prices and import dependency, and particularly rising gas
imports from a single source, Russia. With the policy window of
the gas supply disruptions of 2006 and 2009, the Commission was
able to couple these streams with the problem stream, framing
and problematising these events in such a way as to shift Member
States’ perception of the issue to one that required EU level action.4. The gas supply disruptions of 2006 and 2009 as a ‘policy
window’ exploited by the Commission
The EU is highly dependent both on a single source of gas, from
Russia, and also a single transit route, though Ukraine. Until the
completion of the ﬁrst section of North Stream in 2011, 80 per
cent of gas to the EU from Russia transited through Ukraine
(European Commission, 2009b). After 30 years of stability of
Russian/USSR gas supplies to the EU, a dispute between Ukraine
and Russia led to a gas supply disruption leading to a shortfall in
supplies in the following countries in 2006: Hungary (40 per
cent), Austria, Slovakia and Romania (33 per cent), France (25–30
per cent) and Poland (14 per cent) (BBC, 2006).
Despite this, the perception of Russia as a reliable partner
largely endured until the most serious gas supply disruption
occurred in January 2009, providing what an energy NGO inter-
viewee described as a ‘wake-up call’ to both the gas industry and
Member States (See Personal Interview 4). Negotiations between
Ukraine and Russia broke down and the disruption lasted from
January 1st to January 21st. The Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary,
Romania and Bulgaria suffered gas supply reductions of between
5 and 30 per cent (Womack, 2009), and the Slovakian government
claimed that the economy suffered damage to the sum of 0.5 per
cent of GDP, or h100 m per day for the duration of the disruption
(Laca, 2009).
The Commission responded by continuing to advocate a
community internal and external energy policy, and this exogen-
ous shock proved a catalyst for top-down pressure on policy units
to formulate policies speciﬁcally related to addressing the issue
of energy security, and a Commission interviewee noted that
there was:
A new dynamic as a result of the [2006 and 2009] crisesy an
opportunity for the Commission to develop, recommend and
lobby for a new energy policy for the EU. Something recom-
mended in the 1990s and before, but without the necessary
political will of the Member States, the Council, to take action
(See Personal Interview 5).
The EU’s dependency on energy imports has been exacerbated
by the enlargements of 2004 and 2007. General energy dependency
increased to 52.7 per cent in 2010 (from 46.7 per cent in 2000).7 Terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional
conﬂicts, state failure and organised crime.
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in 2000) (Eurostat, 2012). The Commission’s 2011 opinion was
that in a ‘business as usual’ scenario (without signiﬁcant energy
efﬁciency improvements and renewable deployment), by 2030
more than 70 per cent of EU oil and gas will have to be imported,
with gas import dependency expected to reach 76 per cent by 2020
and 83 per cent by 2030 (European Commission, 2011b).
The Commission’s objectives are to diversify: (a) gas transit
routes, and (b) gas sources. Russian led pipeline projects, North
Stream8 and South Stream9 will address the ﬁrst concern, though
will run counter to the second objective. EU enlargement
increased gas import dependency, and disruptions highlighted
the risk of supplies concentrated on a small number of suppliers
and transit routes. There exist divergent dependencies on gas
imports between Member States. For example, in 2007 Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Finland and Estonia
were between 78 and 100 per cent dependent on Russia for their
gas consumption (European Commission, 2009b), and several
NMS (Hungary, Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia), relied on Russian
gas for approximately one third of their primary energy usage in
2008 (compared to the EU average of 8 per cent) (Europe’s Energy
Portal, 2010). However, the disruptions of 2006 and 2009 drew
newer and older Member States closer together in perceiving
signiﬁcant dependence undiversiﬁed sources of gas as a risk to
energy security, as a Commission interviewee explained:
A coincidence led to an opportunity. A combination of factors:
NMS accession with their focus on security of supply, helped to
highlight the issue and push it further up the agenda, and
advocate solidarity in the matter. (See Personal Interview 11).
As the major supplier of gas to the EU, there are concerns
regarding whether investment in Russian gas infrastructure is
sufﬁcient to keep pace with the forecasts of steadily increasing EU
demand to 2030, as well as in the future satisfying the require-
ments of the fast expanding Asian gas markets (Russian Energy
Strategy, Government of the Russian Federation, 2010). Russia’s
failure to guarantee supplies to nine EU Member States in
February 2012 highlighted ongoing supply concerns (Rettman,
2012), and has kept the policy window open for the Commission.
The 2003 energy strategy of Russia (Government of the Russian
Federation, 2003: 2) highlighted the use of ‘great energy resources’
as an ‘instrument of carrying out internal and external policy’, and
Russia has exploited divisions amongst the EU, and individual
Member States (including Italy, Germany, Hungary, Belgium,
France, Bulgaria and Poland) have simultaneously attempted to
derive energy security through bilateral deals with Russia (Gaz-
prom), undermining the development of a common EU external
security policy.10 Several Commission interviewees noted this was
widely perceived to represent a deliberate ‘divide and rule’ strategy
by Russia (See Personal Interview 6). A stated Russian objective
is that ‘international policy for the long term will focus on the
possession of energy sources’ and ‘[u]nder the conditions of compe-
tition for resources [it] cannot be excluded resolv[ing] problems by
military force’ (Government of the Russian Federation, 2010).
Enlargement of the EU in 2004/2007 has occurred alongside: an
increase in EU energy imports and fossil fuel prices, and gas supply
disruptions. The opening of the policy window related to the latter
enabled the Commission to couple a supranational ‘solution’ to the
emergent ‘problem’ of energy insecurity; that more reasonable
pricing and reliable supplies could be achieved through an internal8 From Russia to Germany.
9 From Russia to Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia and into the Trans
Austrian Gas Pipeline to Italy.
10 Germany also developed the North Stream gas pipeline with Gazprom.EU gas and energy market, supplied by more diversiﬁed sources
of gas.5. Commission energy policy entrepreneurship after 2006:
Successfully promoting limited communitarianisation of EU
energy policy
This section evaluates the extent to which the Commission’s
‘discourse framing’ (Bauer, 2002; Drauth, 2007) has successfully
capitalised on the policy window to promote and implement
solutions to the policy problem that developed after 2006, and
whether this has translated into increased policy competencies.
This is assessed with reference to the EU’s deﬁnition of energy
security11: (a) security (reliability) of supply, and (b) completing an
internal gas market (to also mitigate against supply disruptions).
5.1. The internal energy market
The realisation of an interconnected and integrated internal
energy market is considered by the Commission to increase
energy security through increasing competition, reducing prices,
and providing mechanisms to mitigate disruptions of external
supplies. Regulation and promotion of an internal EU energy
market was a natural corollary of the Commission’s existing
single market competencies, and the Commission has increased
its regulatory powers of the internal energy market it has
promoted and successfully proposed the co-ﬁnancing of.
The EU’s energy Commissioner highlighted in 2006 that
’security of energy supply is only really considered at national
Member State levely we need a much greater European-wide
approach on the issue’ (Piebalgs, 2006). Both the 2006 Green
Paper on energy (published three months after the 2006 gas
supply disruption), and the Commission’s second strategic energy
review in 2008 were reactions to Member State energy diver-
gence and enlargement derived discrepancy of import depen-
dence. The latter stated that ‘[i]nterconnection and solidarity
within the internal market is not only a natural feature of an
integrated market-based system but is equally essential to spread
and reduce individual risk’ (European Commission, 2008).
In June 2009, following the second signiﬁcant gas supply
disruption, a third internal energy market package was adopted
(European Parliament and European Council, 2009b). Articles
6 and 7 oblige Member States to promote regional and bilateral
solidarity and cooperation to safeguard security of supply of
natural gas, through interconnections, mutual assistance, and
co-ordination of contingency measures, and Internal Energy
Market progress reports (Art. 52(6)) also assess security of supply
issues, including bilateral relations with third countries. There has
been then been a degree of vertical integration, a supranational
transfer of authority from the member state to the EU level. The
Commission’s role is now one described by Hadﬁeld (2011) as
that of an ‘enforcer’ of the internal market.
Yet energy markets remained highly concentrated and national in
scope. Long-term contracts and vertical integration between whole-
salers and retailers foreclosed markets to new entrants. Following
proposals from the Commission, and ordinary legislative procedure
(formerly co-decision), the ﬁrst Gas and Electricity Directives were
established in 1998 and 1996, respectively (Council of the European
Union, 1998; European Parliament and Council of the European
Union, 1996). The objective is to complete the internal energy market
by 2014, though divergent energy mixes between Member States11 The other dimension of energy security, reasonableness of pricing, is largely
excluded from this analysis.
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industry threaten to delay this. Infringement procedures were high
for both the ﬁrst and second with recent action taken against 21
Member States in June 2009 (European Commission, 2010a:2–3),
and 18 Member States in September (Europa, 2011) plus 20 gas
companies, including Gazprom, in an anti-monopoly investigation
into long-term gas contracts (Belton et al., 2012).
Associated measures in the internal dimension (with an external
overlap) have aimed to increase gas storage capacity and intercon-
nectedness within Europe by prioritising Trans-European Energy
Networks (TEN-E) (European Parliament and Council of the
European Union, 2006; European Commission, 2011a). With a small
TEN-E budget of h20 million p.a., this prioritises ‘projects of
European interest’, mainly to support feasibility studies. Whilst
apparently weak, this tool ‘can act as an important stimulator at
an early and risky stage’ (Meeus et al., 2006: 597), and can lead to
new ﬁnancing routes, including support from the Structural and
Cohesion Funds and EIB loans as well as Commission appointed
European coordinators of key projects to expedite progress and
garner member state support. It is an example of a degree of supra-
national network planning, funding and coordination support for
key, internal, interconnector projects.
The TEN-E funding scheme remained grounded in the necessity
to resort to market-based principles and ﬁnancing, with EU funding
‘highly exceptional’, restricted to instances of market failure. Yet
investment has been expanded, and made less exceptional. In 2009,
as part of the European Economic Programme for Recovery (EER)
plan, h4 billion was allocated as co-ﬁnancing for energy infrastruc-
ture (h2.4 billion for electricity and gas infrastructure projects)
(European Parliament and European Council, 2009b. From the EEPR,
the European Commission gave grants of h80 million to fund
Poland’s ﬁrst Liqueﬁed Natural Gas terminal at Swinoujscie, to
diversify gas supplies (Polskie, 2010). Similar ﬁnancial support is
being offered for the Baltic States’ LNG terminal, to supply 25 per
cent of the three countries’ energy demand, and the decision
regarding the destination of this has been delegated to the Commis-
sion (EurActiv, 2011).
5.2. External security of supply
After being a net exporter of both gas and oil, the U.K. became a
net importer in 2004 and 2005, respectively (EIA, 2011), and in 2005
the UK’s EU presidency study concluded that stronger EU energy
policy cooperation was necessary to improve security of supplies
(Helm, 2005). This was an important development as the UK, along
with Germany had been key actors in opposing a 2003 Commission
proposal for an Energy Article (See Personal Interview 7). The
Commission’s March 2006 Green Article on energy advocated a
comprehensive Common European Energy Policy, emphasising that
energy security of the external dimension would be improved
through diversiﬁed sources of supply and supply routes, and
negotiating with a ‘single voice’ (European Commission, 2006a).
The Green Article also contained the objective of regular Strategic EU
Energy Reviews (SEER), the ﬁrst of which was completed in January
2007, and this was followed by the 2007 Lisbon Treaty (Council of
the European Union, 2007), which incorporated for the ﬁrst time an
Energy title. Article 4 sets out co-decision (ordinary) legislation
procedure, the ‘[s]hared competence between the Union and the
Member States’ in the ‘(a) internal market; (h) trans-European
networks; [and] (i) energy’. Article 194 included the objectives of
the Union acting ‘in a spirit of solidarity’ to: ‘(a) ensure the
functioning of the energy market [internal]; (b) ensure security of
energy supply in the Union [external];y[and to] (d) promote the
interconnection of energy networks [internal]’.
However, it was also decided that ‘[s]uch measures shall not
affect a Member State’s right to determine the conditions forexploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy
sources and the general structure of its energy supply’ (Council of
the European Union, 2007 Art. 194). What ‘solidarity’ means in this
context remains vague. The Article provided an, ‘interpretative,
rather than legally binding, commitment’ (Konstadinides, 2011). In
terms of formal instruments and competence, the decision-making
in the policy area relies on intergovernmental cooperation and
remains dominated by national preferences. The Lisbon Treaty
reiterated existing decision-making rules in the sphere of energy.
A Commission interviewee reﬂected upon the institution’s
objective:
[There is] a logical need to reﬂect the external dimension
of this internal markety [and] intensify external energy
actions at the EU level [as] there will be joint EU interests
with regards to gas once there is a complete internal market’
and a consequent ‘need at the European level for a stronger
external policy (See Personal Interview 8).
The Council’s 2008 report on the implementation of the
European Security Strategy reﬂected the Commission’s advocacy
of energy security as a high priority, highlighting the importance
of ‘speaking with one voice’ through an ‘EU Energy Security and
Solidarity Action Plan’, with projects to diversify sources and
transit routes at the centre of the overall policy sphere (European
Commission, 2008: 3). However, where the EU’s energy security is
compromised by severe disruptions energy supplies, the compe-
tency for deciding on measures remains with the Council (though
acting on a Commission proposal). Despite the evident shift in
perception and priority relating to the development of the EU’s
energy security identiﬁed in this chapter, binding regulation
upon Member States with regard to external energy security
policy is lacking. Here the Commission’s competence remains
limited.
The European Commission’s Security of Gas Supply Directive
(European Commission, 2009a) facilitated security of supply
responses, and proposals are ongoing for ‘a block purchasing
mechanism for Caspian gas’, ﬁrst raised in 2008 (European
Commission, 2008: 4), and developed into the Caspian Develop-
ment Cooperation, a signiﬁcant proposal for a Europeanised
economic bloc for gas (European Commission, 2010b). Signiﬁ-
cantly, in September 2011, the Council mandated the Commission
to negotiate a legally binding treaty on behalf of the EU, with
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to build a Trans-Caspian gas
pipeline system, ‘the ﬁrst operational decision as part of a co-
ordinated and united external energy strategy’ (European
Commission, 2011a).
Following the gas supply disruption of January 2009, the Com-
mission proposed a regulation on the Security of Gas Supply in the
internal market (European Commission, 2009a). Adopted in 2010
(European Parliament and European Council, 2010), this makes
explicit that security of gas supply in the EU ‘cannot be sufﬁciently
achieved by theMember States alone and can therefore, by reason of
the scale or effects of the action, be better achieved at Union level’
and that ‘security of gas supply is a shared responsibility of natural
gas undertakings, Member Statesy and the Commission’ (Article
3(1)). Article 11 empowered the Commission to declare a Union or
regional emergency if it deemsMember States’ energy infrastructure
and contingency plans to be insufﬁcient.
In the past bilateral energy deals with Russia, often in the form of
long-term contracts, have demonstrated how ‘[e]nergy policies and
industries tended to divergent national models’ (Wood, 2010: 308).
A Commission interviewee concluded that the gas ‘crises’ triggered
increased policy actions within DGs (See Personal Interview 9), and
whilst Johnston (2011) notes that original proposals for the Security
of Gas Supply Regulation were weakened during negotiations in the
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decision-making powers and on-going duty to monitor and report
on gas supply security measures’.
After a proposal in 2009, the Commission was empowered
in 201012 to check and offer an opinion on Member State
energy infrastructure investments and intergovernmental energy
agreements for ‘conformityy with EU law and EU security of
supply objectives’ (European Commission, 2011a). This has
already had the effect of altering gas contracts between Poland
and Russia (PGiNG and Gazprom), amending the 2010 Poland–
Russia Yamal pipeline contract to ensure third party access and
the re-export of excess Russian gas. It is also at the Commission’s
discretion whether to allow shareholders of the Russian South
Stream gas pipeline project exclusive gas transportation by
granting it ‘priority status’, or to force it to allow third party
access by invoking Third Energy Package legislation.
Through proposed funding for h9 billion for energy infrastruc-
ture, external energy projects for which commercial viability is
doubted (but which are deemed of political importance by meet-
ing diversiﬁcation objectives) will be supported from the 2014–
2020 budget (European Commission, 2011c). This was accepted
by the Council and Parliament; a move from ‘highly exceptional’
and minor EU funding, to more far more substantial usage of EU
funds for energy security, and related competition and environ-
mental, goals. The allocation and regulation is decided upon by
the Commission, and will affect both the internal and external
dimensions of EU energy security policy.
In the case of energy security policy development as in trade
policy (Littoz-Monnet, 2012: 519), ofﬁcials in the Commission
utilised ‘expert’ studies to establish knowledge based authority.
With regard to the internal dimension of energy policy an appeal to
established supranational competence in the internal market could
be made, and the history and established norms of market integra-
tion and harmonisation (Baumgartner, 2007: 485). Pollack (1997:
125); argues that a successful policy entrepreneur ‘propose[s],
lobb[ies] for, and sell[s]’ a policy proposal as a solution to problems,
and Kingdon’s (1995) argument was that crises result in conditions
that policy-makers interpret as requiring action, entering the
problem stream. The 2006 disruption was a highly inﬂuential factor
in post-2006 energy discussions in the Council, and the Commission
had pre-existing solutions in the policy stream, framed and pro-
posed to be coupled to this policy ‘problem’. The politics stream
existed as there was a convergence between the preference of NMS
regarding dependence on Russian gas and vulnerability to supply
disruptions and older Member States concerned with the trend
towards increasing gas imports and increasing prices, concerns
reﬂected in societal opinion; with nearly two-thirds of Europeans
surveyed in 2007 supporting EU, rather than national-level solutions
to energy related issues (Eurobarometer, 2007).
The Commission has had a degree of success as a policy
entrepreneur in ‘coupling’ of policy, political and problem ‘streams’,
and in doing so expanding its competences in the internal energy
market, and to a lesser extent in the external dimension. An Energy
NGO representative reﬂected on reasons for increased Commission
competence in energy policy:RegThe Commission is a linchpin of continuity, which can dom-
inate through its knowledge and expertise providing capacity,
and the Lisbon Treaty provided it with a mandate for dealing
with energy (See Personal Interview 10).12 By the 2009 Internal Gas Market Directive and 2010 Security of Gas Supply
ulation.6. Conclusion: Increasing though limited supranational
governance in EU energy policy
In energy policy, the Commission has exploited its role in
environmental protection, competition and the internal market to
‘create as many different policy frames as possible to make energy
legislation viable’ (Tosun and Solorio, 2011: 3; also Pointvogl,
2009: 5708), and has been delegated a minor but increasing role
in the external energy policy dimension.
The article has argued that a factor in explaining increasing
Commission competence was that the institution had a role in the
gradual social construction of energy dependency as a problem,
and during a policy window was able to couple this to a solution
to energy insecurity already in the policy stream (further internal
market integration and diversiﬁcation of supplies). There existed
an underlying trend towards greater energy import dependency.
Increasing prices and EU enlargement to include more import
dependent member states exacerbated this, and increased the
number of actors perceiving Russia as an (energy) security threat
rather than guarantor. The Commission was then in a position to
exploit the policy window that opened due to the two gas supply
disruptions in quick succession (2006 and 2009), with legislation
providing evidence of a critical juncture in energy policy evolution.
The Commission’s steady stream of policy proposals as a solution
to the problems associated with undiversiﬁed and increasing energy
import dependency demonstrated a key element in the process of
agenda-setting. The Commission has had a degree of success in
creating a policy monopoly through building expertise and proble-
matising the issue, and inﬂuencing how energy security and energy
policy is perceived and interpreted within the EU; and how policy
and legislation evolves. The Commission has successfully framed
energy policy as a problem that requires increased (though not
exclusive) supranational governance, recommending solutions and
establishing a role for the institution in their implementation,
regulation and governance.
Commission activism and rhetoric is increasingly backed with
legal instruments, as a result of both successful exploitation of a
policy window in the mid to late 2000s, but also the result of the
agency of Member States. There was a concerted effort of certain,
non-large, NMS to solve intra- and inter-state conﬂicts of interest
through (formally reversible) delegation of regulatory and ﬁnan-
cing powers to the Commission.13 Also, older Member States such
as the UK, as a new energy importer increasingly reliant on
imported gas, no longer blocked the Commission’s proposal for
an Energy Article as they had done in 2003 (See Personal Inter-
view 11), and actively supported the gas market liberalisation14
(The Economist, 2012). Pointvogl (2009) observed that one of the
key drivers in energy policy development, and the willingness to
integrate in this policy area relates to perceptions of supply
security held by member states. In contrast to the period before,
the gas supply disruptions of 2006/2009 provided a window for
the Commission to act as an energy security policy entrepreneur,
contributing towards a shift in the perception of Union gas
supplies from secure to insecure, and dependency on gas imports
on a small number of suppliers (particularly Russia) from positive
to negative.
As noted by De Jong and Schunz (2012), recent developments
have represented a degree of vertical integration and corresponding
consistency in EU energy policy, but the transfer of power from the13 For example, Poland unsuccessfully proposed European Energy Security
Strategy through a solidarity clause with a mechanism based on the guarantee
supplied by NATO (Council of the European Union, 2006b).
14 Where deregulation in 1986 had already brought the gas-on-gas competi-
tion to the country (with gas prices unlinked to the currently higher oil-indexation
price of long term contracts).
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with positions inconsistent and opposed to the further delegation or
erosion of sovereignty in energy security policy, particularly the
external dimension. As enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty, Member
States have been defensive of their right to decide their own energy
mixes, through a belief that this will protect national industry and
national security. Whilst the Commission’s power and authority
regarding the EU internal energy market is greater than in the
external aspect, Member States have also demonstrated their will-
ingness to begin to delegate competencies in the external dimension
to the Commission, exempliﬁed by the September 2011 Council
mandate for the Commission to negotiate a legally binding treaty for
Caspian gas on behalf of the EU.
Elsig’s criteria of power (2010: 789) criteria of power, relate to (a)
agenda-setting, (b) representational and (c) implementation dimen-
sions. Whilst Member States have been unwilling to delegate their
sovereignty fully, the Commission has proposed and received very
limited representational power in terms of conducting negotiations
since September 2011 on behalf of the Member States for new
supplies of natural gas from the Caspian region. Implementation-
related power is present in the internal energy market, where the
Commission now has a role as ‘enforcer’ of the internal energymarket
(Hadﬁeld, 2011)15 and in checking and advising on supply contracts.
Implementation power is also derived from the role as a ﬁnancer of
gas infrastructure (internal and external). Agenda-setting power has
also been demonstrated, in the consistent proposals to develop a
common energy policy in the internal and external dimension.
The incomplete implementation of EU internal energy market
legislation by member states, and the tension between bilateral
and EU actions in the external dimension clearly demonstrates
the intergovernmental logic that remains at the core of EU energy
security policy, undermining its coherence and effectiveness at
least in the terms of supply diversiﬁcation and supply disruption
mitigation. For example, the progress of Russian backed large-
scale gas pipeline projects such as Nord Stream and South Stream
demonstrate the prominence of member state preferences within
the EU, and the inﬂuence of their security and economic interests
relative to the EU’s objectives of diversiﬁcation of supply sources
which both of the Russian backed projects undermine.
Suggesting that political decisions to an extent followed the
direction advocated by the Commission does not preclude the
inﬂuence of Member States, and individual actors. A focus on the
Commission’s role is also the limitation of this research, and further
work is needed to investigate the constellation of shifting power and
authority within this multi-level governance policy sphere, in which
supranational institutions, national energy champions and private
energy companies all play a role in steering the development of EU
energy policy. Further research is also required to assess price; as an
element of energy security, and a motivation for European integra-
tion, and member state delegation of competences to the suprana-
tional level in energy policy. As such the impact of the liberalisation
of the gas market as it moves towards a single Europeanmarket, and
the effect of supranational governance here (success in creating
‘reasonable’ prices), needs to be considered.16
The Commission, as a policy entrepreneur, was a signiﬁcant actor
over time in inﬂuencing the social construction of norms regarding
the appropriateness of a supranational solution to an issue presented
as a problem, even threat, to the Union, and one in which Member
State actions would be inadequate. As a result of Commission
activism in the form of problem-solution coupling and ‘discourse
framing’, a degree of communitarisation and supranationalism in15 Able to impose sanctions in the form of infringement procedures against
Member States.
16 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting the salience of price
as a driver in European energy policy integration.energy policy has been accepted by Member States as a mechanism
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